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Abstract
In their target article, Wang and Busemeyer (2013) [A quantum question or-
der model supported by empirical tests of an a priori and precise prediction.
Topics in Cognitive Science] discuss question order effects in terms of in-
compatible projectors on a Hilbert space. In a similar vein, Blutner recently
presented an orthoalgebraic query language essentially relying on dynamic
update semantics. Here, I shall comment on some interesting analogies be-
tween the different variants of dynamic semantics and generalized quantum
theory to illustrate other kinds of order effects in human cognition, such as
belief revision, the resolution of anaphors, and default reasoning that result
from the crucial non-commutativity of mental operations upon the belief
state of a cognitive agent.
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1. Introduction
In their target article, Wang and Busemeyer (2013) discuss question order
effects in terms of incompatible, i.e. non-commuting, projectors on a Hilbert
space. In their model, a person’s belief state is expressed by a vector in
a linear space that is equipped with a scalar product while the answers to
yes/no-questions correspond to orthogonal subspaces in Hilbert space. A
question is answered by projecting the current belief state vector either onto
the question’s yes or no subspace. When answer subspaces to different ques-
tions do not coincide, the sequence of projections matters and questions are
incompatible to each other.
In a similar vein, Blutner (2012) presented an (ortho-) algebraic approach
for a query language that is not only able to explain question order effects
but also allows the analysis of conditional questions of the form “If Mary
reads this book, will she recommend it to Peter?” (Blutner, 2012). Also
Blutner’s approach essentially relies upon a Hilbert space representation of
belief states where questions induce a decorated partition into orthogonal an-
swer subspaces. Yet, Blutner (2012) explicitly constructs his query language
as a “version of update semantics” (Blutner, 1996; Veltman, 1996) where the
“meaning of a sentence is not its truth condition but rather its impact on
the hearer” (Kracht, 2002).
In my commentary on the target article of Wang and Busemeyer, I
shall further elaborate the interesting analogies between the different vari-
ants of update semantics (Blutner, 1996; Veltman, 1996), dynamic semantics
(Ga¨rdenfors, 1988; beim Graben, 2006; Kracht, 2002), and dynamic logics
(Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991; Staudacher, 1987) on the one hand and
generalized quantum theory (Atmanspacher et al., 2002), respective quantum
dynamic logic (Baltag and Smets, 2011) on the other hand in order to il-
lustrate some other kinds of order effects in human cognition, such as belief
revision, the resolution of anaphors, and default reasoning that essentially re-
sult from the non-commutativity of mental operations upon a person’s belief
states.
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2. Generalized Quantum Theory
In generalized (or “weak”) quantum theory, Atmanspacher et al. (2002) con-
sider a set X as a general state space and functions (morphisms) Mor(X) =
{A|A : X → X}, transforming a state x ∈ X into another state y ∈ X
through
y = A(x) . (1)
Particular functions from a subset A ⊆ Mor(X) are called observables. Ob-
servables can be concatenated, i.e. iteratively invoked, such that (B◦A)(x) =
B(A(x)) = B(y), for all x ∈ X . This observable product AB = A ◦ B is as-
sociative: A(BC) = (AB)C, but in general not commutative: AB 6= BA.
Only when AB = BA, observables are called compatible, otherwise they are
called incompatible.
Atmanspacher et al. (2002) supply a number of further axioms describing
the properties of such observables and their impact upon the state space X .
One of these axioms introduces a neutral element 1, such that
1 ◦A = A ◦ 1 = A (2)
for all A ∈ A. Another axiom additionally introduces a zero observable
0 ∈ A and a zero state o ∈ X , such that
0(x) = o (3)
A(o) = o (4)
0A = A 0 = 0 (5)
for all x ∈ X and A ∈ A.
An important class of observables P ⊂ A are projectors which are idem-
potent
A2 = AA = A . (6)
Applying a projector A to a state x ∈ X yields another state y = A(x) =
A2(x) = A(A(x)) = A(y) that does not change under subsequent applications
of A anymore. The projected state y = A(y) is hence an eigenstate of A.
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3. Classical Dynamic Semantics
Regarding the state space X of generalized quantum theory as the set of epis-
temic states of a cognitive agent, yields an instantiation of dynamic update
semantics (Blutner, 1996; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988; Veltman, 1996) in the following
way: Elements x, y, z ∈ X are called epistemic states, or belief states while
observables A,B ∈ A become interpreted as epistemic operators. By restrict-
ing observables only to commutative and idempotent operators, one obtains
propositions. Their (commutative) composition can then be identified with
logical conjunction
A ∧ B = AB = BA = B ∧ A . (7)
An important notion in dynamic semantics is that of acceptance. A propo-
sition A ∈ P is said to be accepted in state x ∈ X (or x is accepting A),
if
A(x) = x . (8)
That means, the state x is an eigenstate of A. Because propositions are
idempotent, the state y = A(x) always accepts A. Thus, Eq. (1) receives a
straightforward interpretation as information update.
Furthermore, logical consequence (or stability in Blutner (1996)) is defined
as follows: A proposition B is called a logical consequence of a proposition
A, if
B ∧A = A ∧B = A . (9)
In this case, y = A(x) entails B(y) = B(A(x)) = A(x) = y, such that B is
accepted whenever A is accepted in an epistemic state (but not vice versa).
The given system can be equipped with other logical connectives such as
negation (¬A) or disjunction (A ∨ B). Ga¨rdenfors (1988) has proven that
the resulting calculus is equivalent to intuitionist logics which can be further
extended to classical propositional logics. Another important extension is
Bayesian update semantics where states are interpreted as probability dis-
tributions ρ over propositions. Then the impact of a proposition A upon a
belief state ρ is expressed by Bayesian conditionalization
ρA(B) =
ρ(B ∧ A)
ρ(A)
=: ρ(B|A) (10)
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of the distribution with respect to A (van Benthem et al., 2009; Ga¨rdenfors,
1988; beim Graben, 2006).
4. Non-classical Dynamic Semantics
Classical dynamic semantics comprises epistemic operators that are commu-
tative and idempotent propositions. Moreover, such systems are monotonic,
as propositions which already have been accepted remain accepted during
the updating of epistemic states. This follows from commutativity: Let A be
accepted in state x (i.e. A(x) = x) and let B(x) = y, such that B is learned
during the updating from x to y. Then A(y) = A(B(x)) = (A ∧ B)(x) =
(B ∧ A)(x) = B(A(x)) = B(x) = y, saying that A and B are both accepted
in the updated state y.
4.1. Belief revision
However, this account is not appropriate when belief states have to be revised
by new evidence. Belief revision processes are in general not commutative and
hence non-monotonic such that order effects become ubiquitous. Ga¨rdenfors
(1988) introduces a belief-revision operator as a mapping ∗ : P → A \ P
assigning a revision A∗ ∈ A \ P to a proposition A ∈ P. This revision
dynamics has to obey several minimality axioms.
In order to illustrate this process, consider an agent in a belief state x that
accepts the propositionA =“the moon consists of blue cheese” (beim Graben,
2006). Its revision is hence A∗ = “the moon does not consist of blue cheese”.
Another proposition might be B = “the moon consists of stone”. Since
x accepts A, the application of B, B(x), leads to the zero state o ∈ X of
generalized quantum theory, that becomes now interpreted as the absurd state
accepting every proposition (Ga¨rdenfors, 1988). Therefore also BA = “the
moon consists of blue cheese and of stone” is accepted in o. This state does
not change under the revision A∗, hence (A∗B)(x) = o. On the other hand the
product BA∗ applied to x yields B(y) where y = A∗(x) accepts the revision
of A. Therefore, BA∗(x) 6= o because BA∗ = “the moon does not consist of
blue cheese, it rather consists of stone” can be consistently accepted. Thus
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A∗B 6= BA∗, i.e. belief revisions and propositions do generally not commute
and are hence incompatible to each other.
Belief revision in a probabilistic, Bayesian framework requires condi-
tionalization with respect to a minimally altered probability distribution
ρ∗ which involves several technical peculiarities such as epistemic entrench-
ment (Baltag and Smets, 2008; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988; beim Graben, 2006). In
the framework of quantum cognition, however, Bayesian conditionalization
is replaced by the Lu¨ders-Niestegge rule (Lu¨ders, 1950; Niestegge, 2008)
ρA(B) =
ρ(ABA)
ρ(A)
(11)
(see also Blutner (2009); Blutner et al. (2013)) resulting from the non-commutativity
of Hilbert space projections (Atmanspacher et al., 2002), where ρ(A) = |〈ψ|A|ψ〉|2
gives the quantum probability in state vector |ψ〉. Therefore, belief revision
seems to be a good candidate for quantum probability models in dynamic
semantics (Engesser and Gabbay, 2002).1
4.2. Anaphor resultion
Another important example for order effects in dynamic semantics is the reso-
lution of anaphors. For this aim, Staudacher (1987) and Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1991) have independently developed models of dynamic predicate logics,
where quantifiers, such as “there exists an x” or “for all x”, and anaphors,
e.g. pronouns, are described by epistemic operators acting upon model the-
oretic valuations (see also Kracht (2002)).
As an instructive example we consider three propositions A =“John sat
at the table”, B =“George came in”, and C =“he was wearing a hat”
1 Equation (11) holds for self-adjoint projectors on Hilbert space. For general operators
that are not necessarily self-adjoint, one had (Atmanspacher et al., 2002)
ρA(B) =
ρ(A∗BA)
ρ(A∗A)
.
It might be tempting to speculate about the possible relationship between the belief revi-
sion operator “∗” in dynamic semantics and the algebra involution “∗” in quantum theory.
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(beim Graben, 2006). Here, the pronoun “he” assumes conflicting interpre-
tations for the compositions CBA = “John sat at the table; George came in;
he was wearing a hat” and CAB= “George came in; John sat at the table; he
was wearing a hat”. In the first case, the pronoun “he” refers to “George”,
while it refers to “John” in the second case. These anaphors therefore have
to be described as non-commutative operators as well.
4.3. Default reasoning
Finally, Blutner (1996) and Veltman (1996) have observed that by relaxing
the stability condition of logical consequence in (9), dynamic logics becomes
non-monotonic. This allows the treatment of default operations, such as
“may” or “normally”. Veltman (1996) presented a nice example for such an
ordering effect in default reasoning: Let A =“Somebody is knocking at the
door”, B =“Maybe it’s John”, and C =“It’s Mary”. Then the composition
CBA =“Somebody is knocking at the door. Maybe it’s John. It’s Mary.”
makes perfect sense, while BCBA =“Somebody is knocking at the door.
Maybe it’s John. It’s Mary. Maybe it’s John.” does not.
5. Conclusion
Classical dynamic semantics formalizes propositional logics in terms of com-
mutative and idempotent epistemic operators that constitute a monotonic
system of belief updating dynamics. By contrast, belief revision, the res-
olution of anaphors and non-monotonic reasoning in default logics require
non-commutative operations.
In probabilistic dynamic semantics, updating is expressed by means of
Bayesian conditionalization, whereas the description of belief revision pro-
cesses requires rather peculiar mechanisms that could probably be more nat-
urally expressed by means of quantum probability theory.
Other types of cognitive order effects such as anaphor resolution or de-
fault reasoning have been successfully described by extensions of dynamic
semantics including predicate calculus or non-monotonicity. To my present
knowledge, probabilistic generalizations of these models utilizing quantum
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probability theory have not yet been devised. This might be a promising
direction for future research.
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